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Abstract. In 2013, Boneh and Zhandry introduced the notion of indis-
tinguishability (IND) in chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext
(CCA) attacks by a quantum adversary which is given superposition ac-
cess to an oracle for encryption and decryption queries but is restricted
to classical queries in the challenge phase. In this paper we define IND-
CPA and IND-CCA notions for symmetric encryption schemes where
the adversary has full quantum superposition access to the oracle, and
give constructions that achieve these security notions. Our results are
formulated in the concrete security framework.
1 Introduction
Even though scalable quantum computers cannot be built using current tech-
nology, the fact that they may become possible in the future has an impact
on present-day information security. The relatively recent field of post-quantum
cryptography [2] therefore studies classical schemes that remain secure if the ad-
versary possesses a quantum computer. (Here and throughout the paper, “clas-
sical” is taken to mean “non-quantum”.) Since the subject of post-quantum
cryptography is the security of present classical technology against future quan-
tum attacks, the usual assumption is that only the adversary possesses quantum
capabilities. This means that all communication between the adversary and the
legitimate parties, in particular oracle access, is assumed to be classical.
In 2013, Boneh and Zhandry [5] went beyond this paradigm by introducing
a security model in which the adversary is given quantum superposition access
to encryption and decryption oracles. Their work is of considerable conceptual
interest. In addition, it may become practically relevant in a future technological
landscape where some cryptographic protocols are implemented on quantum
computers.
Boneh and Zhandry define a notion of indistinguishability (IND) in chosen
plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks through a game with two
phases. In the first phase (the query phase) the adversary is given unrestricted
superposition oracle access. In the second phase (the challenge phase) the ad-
versary is only allowed to make classical queries.
Why is there a restriction in the challenge phase? In their paper, Boneh and
Zhandry show that some restriction is necessary. The reason is, effectively, that
a quantum computer can easily distinguish between the encryption of a single
message and the encryption of an equal superposition of all possible messages,
independently of the details of the encryption. The restriction to classical chal-
lenge queries prevents the adversary to exploit this fact and allows Boneh and
Zhandry to prove that their security notion is achievable. It is worth pointing
out that even in standard (classical) indistinguishability notions it is necessary
to restrict the class of allowed challenge queries, to prevent the adversary from
winning the game trivially by exploiting information about, e.g., message length.
There is a sense, however, in which a restriction to classical challenge queries
seems too strong. Considering quantum oracle access makes sense only in view of
a future technological environment in which the legitimate parties use quantum
computers. In such an environment, it is likely that the encryption schemes
considered here will form part of a wider quantum communication infrastructure.
Without a precise specification of the nature of this infrastructure, one should
not rule out a priori the possibility that an adversary might benefit from the
ability to distinguish between superpositions of messages or ciphertexts.
In this paper we introduce an achievable security notion where the adversary
has full superposition access to an oracle. We define an indistinguishability (IND)
notion in both chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks.
Our IND notion, which we call “real or permutation” (RoP), is equivalent to
standard IND notions in the case of classical oracle queries, but is immune to the
attack discovered by Boneh and Zhandry in the case of quantum superposition
queries. It also falls outside the classification of security notions recently given
by Gagliardoni, Hu¨lsing and Schaffner [6]. It would be worthwhile to study the
relationship between our CPA notion and the qIND-qCPA notion defined in [6].
Whereas we consider direct quantum-mechanical interaction between adversary
and oracle, qIND-qCPA requires the adversary to submit classical descriptions
of its quantum queries.
In a RoP experiment, the adversary is given access to one of two encryption
oracles. One oracle simply encrypts challenge messages chosen by the adversary,
whereas the other oracle applies a random permutation to the message and then
encrypts it. The adversary’s goal is to distinguish between the two cases. For
classical queries, applying a random permutation to a message is equivalent to
replacing the message by a random string. For classical queries, the RoP security
notion is therefore equivalent to the “real or random” notion defined in [3]. In
the quantum case, the RoP notion allows for arbitrary quantum superposition
queries in all phases of the experiment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our security
model, for which we adopt the concrete-security paradigm [3]. Section 3 dis-
cusses quantum pseudorandom functions (QPRF) and their existence from the
concrete-security standpoint. In Section 4 we define our real or permutation IND-
CPA notion and show that it is achieved by a slight modification of a standard
construction. The CCA case is the topic of Section 5. The proof that the RoP
IND-CCA notion is achievable is the main contribution of this paper. The proof
contains new ideas and substantial input from quantum information theory.
2 Security Model
In this paper we address the security of symmetric encryption schemes against
quantum adversaries [8,11]. We adopt the usual definition of a symmetric en-
cryption scheme as a triple SE = (K, E ,D) consisting of a (randomized) key
generation algorithm K, a (randomized) encryption algorithm that takes a plain-
text M and a key K and returns a ciphertext C = EK(M), and a decryption
algorithm satisfying DK(EK(M)) = M for all messages M . We assume that E
is randomized, i.e., its output depends on a string r which is chosen randomly
each time E is invoked.
We will consider both chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), where an adversary
is given access to an encryption oracle, and chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA),
where the adversary in addition has access to a decryption oracle. We will assume
that both E and D are implemented on a quantum computer [10], and that the
adversary is given superposition access to the corresponding oracles. By this
we mean, roughly, that the adversary can make encryption queries consisting
of quantum superpositions of messages, to which the oracle responds with a
corresponding superposition of ciphertexts, and similarly for decryption queries
in the CCA case.
Formally we define a superposition query as follows. For any function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m we define a unitary transformation, Uf , on a (n +m)-qubit
register by
Uf |x, y〉 = |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉 , (1)
where x is an n-bit string, y is an m-bit string, and
|x, y〉 = |x〉|y〉 = |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 , (2)
the computational basis states, form an orthonormal basis of 2n+m-dimensional
complex Hilbert space. Equation (1) defines the action of Uf for arbitrary quan-
tum states on the quantum register, including superposition states and including
the case that the register is entangled with some other quantum register.
In this scenario, an encryption query consists in the application of the unitary
UEK to a quantum register under the control of the adversary, and similarly for a
decryption query. We place no restrictions on the initial state of the adversary’s
register. If the initial state is of the superposition form |ψ〉 =∑M cM |M, 0〉 with
arbitrary complex coefficients cM , the result of the query is
UEK |ψ〉 =
∑
M
cM |M, EK(M)〉 . (3)
The resources required to apply the unitary UEK to a quantum register are
independent of the initial state |ψ〉 of the register. Applying a unitary can be
thought of as a single physical operation, for which the number of terms in the
superposition state |ψ〉 is irrelevant. Since the encryption oracle does not “know”
whether it acts on a superposition or on a single basis state, we will assume that
the random string r required for the randomized encryption is chosen exactly
once every time UEK is applied. This means that r is the same for all terms in
the sum in Eq. (3).
In the most general definition, a quantum adversary A is a quantum algo-
rithm that runs on a quantum computer. In this paper, we will assume that
A takes an (optional) bit string i as input, has access to one or more oracles
f1, f2, . . . and eventually halts, outputting a bit string o. We will denote this
process by
o← Af1,f2,...(i) . (4)
We will assume that A maintains a quantum register QA for the purpose of
making oracle queries, a quantum register SA for doing quantum computations
and for storing its internal state between invocations, and a register RA for
classical input and output. Passing an argument i to A is done by placing i into
the register RA. One could model RA as a quantum register, but in practice one
would expect quantum algorithms to have classical as well as quantum parts.
Whenever A makes a query to an oracle f , the unitary operation Uf defined in
Eq. (1) is applied to the register QA. Since it is implicit in Eq. (1) that Uf is
applied to n+m qubits, we will assume that A puts the parameters n and m in
the register RA if there is any ambiguity.
In this paper we adopt the concrete security framework [3]. Instead of focusing
on polynomial algorithms in an asymptotic sense, concrete security concerns
bounds on an adversary’s success probability as a function of the actual resources
available to the adversary.
The most relevant resources for the purposes of this paper are the running
time of a quantum adversary A, and the number of oracle queries made by A.
We define the running time as the time, in seconds, that elapses until A writes its
final output and halts, including any initialization steps. There exist a number
of further potentially important resource parameters, such as memory size, or
the number of qubits required by A, but since these do not play any explicit role
in the reduction arguments given below, we will not discuss them here.
Our reduction arguments can be read in a very “concrete” way, e.g., “if there
exists a specific quantum adversary that, in 104 seconds and using 109 oracle
queries achieves an advantage of 2 × 10−2 in an attack on scheme X , then one
can construct another quantum adversary that, also in 104 seconds and using 109
oracles queries, achieves an advantage of at least 10−2 in an attack on scheme
Y .” Working within the concrete-security paradigm and measuring running time
in seconds rather than as the number of, say, gate operations has the clear
advantage that it leads to definitions and theorems which are independent of
any particular computing or quantum computing model.
3 Quantum pseudorandom functions
In a concrete security framework, a quantum pseudorandom function, or QPRF,
is simply a family of functions. What turns a family of functions into a QPRF
is a pair of experiments that defines an adversary’s QPRF advantage.
Exp
qprf−0
F (A)
K ← K
b← AFK
return b
Exp
qprf−1
F (A)
f ← Func (X ,Y)
b← Af
return b
Fig. 1. The two experiments defining a QPRF.
So let F : K×X → Y be a function family identified by the set K. Consider
two oracles: one formed by an instance FK = F (K, ·) for a random K ∈ K,
the other given by a function f chosen randomly from the set Func(X ,Y) of
functions from X to Y. The QPRF advantage is a measure of the adversary’s
ability to distinguish an instance drawn from the function family from a function
chosen at random from Func(X ,Y).
Definition 1 (QPRF). Define experiments Expqprf−0F and Exp
qprf−1
F as in
Figure 1. In both experiments, the quantum adversary A is given access to an
oracle and eventually outputs a bit, b. In Expqprf−0F , a key K ∈ K in chosen at
random and the adversary’s oracle queries are answered by applying the unitary
operator UFK to the adversary’s register QA. In Exp
qprf−1
F , a function f ∈
Func(X ,Y) is chosen at random and the adversary’s oracle queries are answered
by similarly applying the unitary operator Uf . The QPRF advantage of A is
defined as
Adv
qprf
F (A) = Pr
[
Exp
qprf−1
F (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exp
qprf−0
F (A) = 1
]
.
In the next two sections, we will analyze the security of encryption schemes
which are based on a QPRF. For these schemes to be secure, we need to assume
that there exists a function family F such that its QPRF-advantage is extremely
small for any quantum adversary using resources that are available now or might
become available in the foreseeable future. Such function families are widely
believed to exist in the form of standard block ciphers, for instance AES-256.
The best currently known quantum attack against AES-256 uses Grover’s search
algorithm [7,10] and requires of the order of 2128 queries to find the encryption
key with high probability. The security of the schemes discussed below depends
on the heuristic assumption that AES-256 or similar block ciphers cannot be
broken by a quantum computer using realistic resources.
4 Quantum Superposition Chosen Plaintext Attack
To define indistinguishability in a CPA attack for a symmetric encryption scheme
SE , we introduce a pair of experiments as in Figure 2. We call them real or
permutation, or RoP, experiments, in analogy to the real or random notion
defined in [3]. In each experiment, the quantum adversary is given superposition
access to an encryption oracle. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption
query by applying a unitary transformation to the adversary’s quantum register
Exp
rop−qscpa−b
SE
(A)
K ←$K
b′ ←$ARoPQA ()
return b′
RoPQA ()
if b = 1 then
Apply UEK (·) to QA
else
Π ←$Perm (n)
Apply UΠ(·) to QA
Apply UEK (·) to QA
end if
return
Fig. 2. The RoP-qsCPA confidentiality notion
QA. The transformation depends on the bit b. If b = 1, the transformation is
given by
|m,x〉 −→ |m,x⊕ EK (m)〉 , (5)
and if b = 0, it is
|m,x〉 −→ |m,x⊕ EK (Π (m))〉 , (6)
where Π is a permutation chosen uniformly at random. This means that in
the case b = 0, before the encryption a random permutation is applied to each
term in the superposition of plaintexts. The goal of the quantum adversary is to
distinguish between the two experiments.
Definition 2 (RoP-qsCPA). Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. Define experiment Exprop−qscpa−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and
a bit b as shown in Figure 2. In the experiment, the adversary A is given quantum
superposition access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle RoPQA (). The
encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary transformation
to the adversary’s quantum register QA.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b,
and the experiment returns b′ as well. The advantage of A is given by:
Adv
rop−qscpa
SE (A) = Pr
[
Exp
rop−qscpa−1
SE (A) = 1
]
−Pr
[
Exp
rop−qscpa−0
SE (A) = 1
]
.
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as defined
in Section 2. ⊓⊔
We now show that the above RoP-qsCPA indistinguishability notion can be
achieved. To motivate our construction, we first show that the following stan-
dard construction (see, e.g., [9]) is insecure with respect to our notion :
Construction 1’: Let F be a QPRF. The following construction defines a sym-
metric encryption scheme SE = (E ,D):
E (K,m) : r ←$ {0, 1}∗
c← FK (r) ⊕m
output (r, c)
D (K, r, c) : m← FK (r)⊕ c
output (m)
Suppose the state N∑m |0,m〉 is submitted to the encryption oracle, where
N is a normalization constant. In the “real case” (b = 1), the result is the
state N ∑m |m,m ⊕ y〉, where y = FK(r). In the “permutation” case (b = 0),
the result is the state N∑m |m,Π(m⊕ y)〉. A Fourier transform followed by a
measurement will distinguish these two states with probability almost 1.
The problem is that the same randomness r is used for all terms in the su-
perposition. The following modified construction overcomes this problem.
Construction 1: Let F be a QPRF. The following construction defines a sym-
metric encryption scheme SE = (E ,D):
E (K,m) : r ←$ {0, 1}∗
s← Fr (m)
c← FK (s)⊕m
output (s, c)
D (K, s, c) : m← FK (s)⊕ c
output (m)
To prove that the modified construction achieves our notion of RoP-qsCPA
security, we are going to provide a straightforward reduction proof. In the con-
crete security framework adopted here this means that, if the above construction
can be broken by a specific quantum adversary, the reduction establishes the exis-
tence of a quantum adversary using similar resources that breaks the underlying
QPRF. But as we saw in Section 3, a QPRF based on a suitably chosen block
cipher is currently thought to be secure against quantum attacks.
Theorem 1 (RoP-qsCPA security is achievable). Let A be a quantum ad-
versary attacking the encryption scheme SE, based on a QPRF F as in Con-
struction 1, in the RoP-qsCPA sense. Assume A makes at most q queries to the
encryption oracle and has advantage
Advrop−qscpaSE (A) ≥ ǫ .
Then there exists a quantum adversary B attacking F , making at most q queries
to the encryption oracle and having advantage
AdvqprfF (B) ≥
ǫ
2(q + 1)
.
Proof. To prove the theorem one (i) establishes the security of the scheme
when F is replaced by a truly random function f . Then (ii) one shows that, if
the scheme is insecure when the QPRF F is used, then there exists a quantum
adversary which can distinguish F from a truly random function and thus breaks
F .
For part (i), assume that in Construction 1, the QPRF FK is replaced
by a random function g, and in the j-th invocation of the encryption ora-
cle (j = 1, . . . , q), the QPRF Fr is replaced by a random function fj . As-
sume that the length of s is chosen so large that computing fj(m) for all m
and j leads to collisions with exponentially small probability. For simplicity
we assume that the same QPRF is used throughout, if necessary by padding
keys and/or arguments. No collisions means that for all m1,m2 in the mes-
sage space and for all i, j, fi(m1) = fj(m2) ⇒ i = j and m1 = m2. Then
g(fj(m)) for all m and j are independent random strings. Therefore the set
{(fj(m), g(fj(m)) ⊕m)} is information-theoretically indistinguishable from the
set {(fj(m), g(fj(m))⊕Π(m))}. It follows that having access to superpositions
of states from the one or the other set cannot give rise to a positive advantage.
The above argument relies on the fact that information-theoretic notions
carry over to the quantum case. This is the only quantum argument needed in
this proof. Part (ii) of the proof proceeds by a standard hybrid argument that
assumes only classical queries. It is therefore omitted here.
5 Quantum Superposition Chosen Ciphertext Attack
In a CCA attack against a symmetric encryption scheme SE the quantum adver-
sary is given, in addition to an encryption oracle as in the CPA case, superposi-
tion access to a decryption oracle. To define indistinguishability in this case, we
introduce the pair of experiments in Figure 3. The decryption oracle responds to
each decryption query by applying the following unitary transformation to the
quantum adversary’s register QA:
|x, c〉 −→ |x⊕DK(c), c〉 . (7)
To arrive at a meaningful definition, we have to exclude decryption queries con-
sisting in the results of encryption queries.
Definition 3 (RoP-qsCCA). Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. Define experiment Exprop−qscca−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and
a bit b as in Figure 3. In the experiment, the adversary A is given quantum
superposition access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle RoPQA () as well
as a decryption oracle, DecQA ().
Now denote by ρei the state of the register QA directly after the i-th encryption
query, and by ρdj the state of the register directly before the j-th decryption query.
For any (classical) ciphertext c that occurs as the result of an encryption query,
i.e., for any ciphertext c such that 〈c|ρei |c〉 6= 0 for some i, we require 〈c|ρdj |c〉 = 0
for all j.
Exp
rop−qscca−b
SE
(A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoPQA (),DecQA ()
return b′
RoPQA ()
if b = 1 then
Apply UEK (·) to QA
else
Π ←$Perm (n)
Apply UΠ(·) to QA
Apply UEK (·) to QA
end if
return
DecQA ()
Apply UDK(·) to QA
return
Fig. 3. The RoP-qsCCA confidentiality notion
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b,
and the experiment returns b′ as well. The advantage of A is given by
Adv
rop−qscca
SE (A) = Pr
[
Exp
rop−qscca−1
SE (A) = 1
]
−Pr
[
Exp
rop−qscca−0
SE (A) = 1
]
.
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as defined
in Section 2. ⊓⊔
The restriction on the adversary’s decryption queries could be made less
restrictive by replacing the condition 〈c|ρdj |c〉 = 0 by 〈c|ρdj |c〉 < δ for some δ > 0.
The complication entailed by this did not, however, seem justified as, due to
the randomization, the ciphertext space is much larger than the message space.
It is worth pointing out it cannot be checked even in principle whether the
adversary honors the restriction on its decryption queries. This is because, in
a superposition query, the oracle (or experiment) can have no information on
what messages or ciphertexts are submitted as part of the query.
We now show that the above indistinguishability notion can be achieved by
the following standard Encrypt-then-MAC construction [4]:
Construction 2: Let SE = (E ,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme and let F
be a QPRF. The following construction defines a symmetric encryption scheme
SE ′ = (E ′,D′):
E ′ ((K1,K2) ,m) : c← EK1 (m) , τ ← FK2 (c)
output (c, τ)
D′ ((K1,K2) , c, τ) : τ ′ ← FK2 (c) , m← DK1 (c)
if τ = τ ′, output (m)
otherwise, output ⊥
The symbol ⊥ denotes some fixed string that is outside the message space.
The decryption returns ⊥ if the tag is invalid. A quantum decryption oracle is
described by a unitary operator V acting on a register state |x, c, τ〉 as follows:
V |x, c, τ〉 =
{ |x⊕DK1 (c) , c, τ〉 if FK2 (c) = τ ,
|x⊕⊥, c, τ〉 otherwise. (8)
The following theorem establishes that, if the above construction can be
broken by a specific quantum adversary, then there exist quantum adversaries
using similar resources that break the underlying QPRF or the RoP-qsCPA
security of the underlying scheme SE . But as we saw in Sections 3 and 4, a
QPRF based on a suitably chosen block cipher is currently thought to be secure
against quantum attacks, and RoP-qsCPA security is achievable.
Theorem 2 (RoP-qsCCA security is achievable). Consider the scheme
SE ′ in Construction 2 based on a QPRF F and an encryption scheme SE . As-
sume A is a quantum adversary attacking SE ′ in the RoP-qsCCA sense, making
at most qe encryption and qd decryption queries to the oracle, and having ad-
vantage
Advrop−qsccaSE′ (A) ≥ ǫ .
Then there exist quantum adversaries B and J attacking SE and F respectively,
as follows. B makes at most qe encryption oracle queries. J makes at most qd
oracle queries. The advantages satisfy
Advrop−qscpaSE (B) + 2 ·AdvqprfF (J ) ≥ ǫ − 2
(
1 + 2q2d
)
2−nτ/4 ,
where nτ is the length of the tag τ as defined in Construction 2.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we first modify Construction 2 by replacing
F with a true random function f . We then show, roughly, (i) that a quantum
adversary that can distinguish between these two constructions can break the
QPRF security of F , and (ii) that a quantum adversary that breaks the modified
construction can break the CPA security of the underlying scheme SE .
We denote the modified scheme by S˜E = (E˜ , D˜):
E˜ (K1,m) : c← EK1 (m) , τ ← f(c)
output (c, τ)
D˜ (K1, c, τ) : τ ′ ← f(c), m← DK1 (c)
if τ = τ ′, output (m)
otherwise, output ⊥
Here, f is a function chosen uniformly at random.
Now let A be a quantum adversary attacking the CCA security of SE ′. A
standard argument [9] then leads to the construction of a quantum adversary J
attacking the QPRF F , making qd oracles queries and having advantage
AdvqprfF (J ) ≥
1
2
Advrop−qsccaSE′ (A)−
1
2
Advrop−qscca
S˜E
(A) , (9)
where the right hand side is one-half the difference between the advantages of A
in the experiments Exprop−qscca−bSE′ (A) and Exprop−qscca−bS˜E (A) respectively.
To represent the actions of the oracles on the register QA of the quantum
adversary A, it is convenient to split QA in three sections, as follows. In the case
of S˜E , the action of the encryption oracle is then given by
|m,x, y〉 −→ |m,x⊕ c, y ⊕ τ〉 , (10)
where
c =
{EK1(m) if b = 1 ,
EK1(Π(m)) if b = 0 , (11)
and τ = f(c), and the action of the decryption oracle is given by
|x, c, τ〉 −→
∣∣∣x⊕ D˜K1(c, τ), c, τ〉 . (12)
We can use a quantum adversary A attacking the RoP-qsCCA security of S˜E
to construct a quantum adversary B attacking the RoP-qsCPA security of SE
using qe encryption oracles queries. The quantum adversary B runs A, and uses
its oracles to provide a simulation of A’s oracles in the RoP-qsCCA experiment.
B simulates A’s decryption queries by answering all of them with ⊥. We need
to link the advantages of A and B.
The main difficulty here is to derive a bound on the additional advantage of
A due to its ability to make decryption queries. In a classical (non-quantum)
setting, since f is a true random function, the probability that an adversary
forges a valid tag for a ciphertext would be qd/2
nτ . A classical adversary therefore
would get ⊥ almost every time in response to its decryption queries, which means
that the decryption oracle would be essentially useless to the classical adversary.
But because our adversary A is able to make superposition queries, we have to
work harder.
As in the classical proof, we will derive the required bound by considering a
modified decryption oracle which always returns ⊥ in response to the quantum
adversary’s decryption queries, irrespective of the values of c and τ . We will refer
to the experiment with the modified oracle as scenario Q0, and to the original
experiment as scenario Q1.
In scenario Q1, the decryption oracle returns ⊥ only if the tag is invalid.
Similary to Eq. (8), the action of the decryption oracle is thus described by the
unitary operator V acting on a register state |x, c, τ〉 as follows:
V |x, c, τ〉 =
{ |x⊕DK1 (c) , c, τ〉 if f (c) = τ ,
|x⊕⊥, c, τ〉 otherwise. (13)
The time evolution of the quantum adversary can then be written as
UqdV . . .U2VU1VU0 |s〉 , (14)
followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b′. The input
state |s〉 is the result of some initialisation. The unitary operators Ui describe
the evolution of the adversary between decryption queries and include the actions
of the encryption oracle. The probability of outcome b′ depends on the bit b in
the experiment. We will denote the probability that the outcome in scenario Q1
is b′ = 1 for the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 by PrQ1−0(b′ = 1) and PrQ1−1(b′ = 1),
respectively. We have then
Advrop−qscca
S˜E
(A) = AdvQ1 = PrQ1−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ1−0(b′ = 1) , (15)
where we have introduced the notation AdvQ1 for convenience.
The only difference in scenario Q0 is that the decryption oracle always returns
⊥. We denote the action of the decryption oracle in this case by V˜, which acts
like this:
V˜ |x, c, τ〉 = |x⊕⊥, c, τ〉 . (16)
The time evolution of the quantum adversary in scenario Q0 is then given by
UqdV˜ . . .U2V˜U1V˜U0 |s〉 , (17)
again followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b′. We will
denote the probability that the outcome in scenario Q0 is b′ = 1 for the two
cases b = 0 and b = 1 by PrQ0−0(b′ = 1) and PrQ0−1(b′ = 1), respectively.
Since in scenario Q0 the decryption oracle always return ⊥, it is not useful for
the quantum adversary A. This leads to a bound on the CPA advantage of the
adversary B:
Advrop−qscpaSE (B) ≥ AdvQ0 = PrQ0−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−0(b′ = 1) , (18)
where we have introduced the notation AdvQ0 again for convenience.
The key relation between the probabilities for scenarios Q0 and Q1 is pro-
vided by the following claim:
PrQ1−b(b′ = 1) ≤ PrQ0−b(b′ = 1) + (1 + 2n2d) 2−nτ/4 , (19)
independently of the value of the bit b. From inequality (19), together with the
unproblematic assumption that PrQ0−b(b′ = 1) ≤ PrQ1−b(b′ = 1), we can deduce
|AdvQ1 −AdvQ0|
= |PrQ1−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ1−0(b′ = 1)− (PrQ0−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−0(b′ = 1))|
= |PrQ1−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−1(b′ = 1)− (PrQ1−0(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−0(b′ = 1))|
≤ |PrQ1−1(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−1(b′ = 1)|+ |PrQ1−0(b′ = 1)− PrQ0−0(b′ = 1)|
≤ 2(1 + 2n2d) 2−nτ/4 . (20)
Together with Eqs. (9), (15) and (18), this implies
Adv
rop−qscpa
SE (B) + 2 ·AdvqprfF (J ) ≥ Advrop−qsccaSE′ (A)− 2
(
1 + 2q2d
)
2−nτ/4 ,
(21)
which proves the theorem.
All that remains to be done is therefore to prove the claim (19). We start
by examining the expressions (14) and (17). Since, in general, the unitaries Ui
entangle the adversary’s quantum register with its internal registers, one cannot
assume that the quantum register is in a pure state during decryption queries.
Denote by C the set of all (classical) ciphertexts c. For any ciphertext c ∈ C,
define the projector
Projc =
∑
m,τ
|m, c, τ〉〈m, c, τ | = I ⊗ |c〉〈c| ⊗ I . (22)
Denote by ρei the state of the quantum register after the i-th encryption
query in scenario Q1. Let C′ be the set of all ciphertexts that do not result from
any encryption query. That is, C′ is the set of ciphertexts that have zero weight
in all encryption queries, i.e.,
C′ = {c ∈ C : Tr (Projcρei ) = 0 , i = 1, . . . , qe} , (23)
where Tr denotes the trace. We can now define the set Cvalid as the set of pairs
(c, f(c)) that do not result from any encryption query,
Cvalid = {(c, f(c)) : c ∈ C′} . (24)
Since
|Cvalid| = 2−nτ |C′ × {0, 1}nτ | , (25)
trying to guess τ = f (c) given a ciphertext c ∈ C′ leads to a valid pair with very
small probability. The results of the qe encryption queries contain no information
about the set Cvalid.
Now let ρdi be the state of the quantum register before the i-th decryption
query in scenario Q1, and define
Projvalid =
∑
(c,τ)∈Cvalid
|c, τ〉〈c, τ | . (26)
We can now define Wval,i as the total weight of terms belonging to Cvalid in the
i-th decryption query (i = 1, . . . , qd),
Wval,i = Tr
(
ρdi Projvalid
)
. (27)
This can be re-expressed as follows. Let
∣∣ψdi 〉 be the state of the totality of the
adversary’s quantum registers immediately before the i-th decryption query in
scenario Q1, ∣∣ψdi 〉 = Ui−1V . . .U1VU0 |s〉 , (28)
which can be expanded in the form∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c,τ
λj,m,c,τ |j,m, c, τ〉 , (29)
where j labels the computational basis states of all internal registers (i.e., all
registers in addition to the register QA). We then have
Wval,i =
〈
ψdi
∣∣Projvalid ∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c
∣∣λj,m,c,f(c)∣∣2 = 1− ∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2 .
(30)
The probability that a direct measurement after the i-th decryption query gives
a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid is then given by the expectation value E (Wval,i).
Now the optimal way of searching for a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid is Grover’s
algorithm [7,10]. As long as i is less than the minimum number of queries re-
quired for Grover’s algorithm to succeed with certainty (which is approximately
pi
4
√
2nτ ), the best probability with which any quantum algorithm can find a
string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid using i queries is exactly the probability PrGrover achieved
by running Grover’s algorithm with i queries [12,1]. That probability is equal to
PrGrover = sin
2
((
i+ 12
)
θ
)
, where sin θ2 =
√
2−nτ [10]. To a very good approxi-
mation,
PrGrover = 4i
2 2−nτ . (31)
By measuring the quantum register after the i-th query and then stopping,
the quantum adversary can find a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid with probability E (Wval,i).
Therefore we must have
E (Wval,i) ≤ 4i2 2−nτ (32)
for i = 1, . . . , qd. What we actually need is a bound on the probabilities for√
Wval,i. For any random variable X ≥ 0, we have Var(
√
X) ≥ 0 and thus
E(
√
X) ≤√E(X). Hence,
E
(√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2i 2−nτ/2 . (33)
Now we want to compare the probability of outputting the guess b′ = 1
in scenario Q0 and the probability of outputting the guess b′ = 1 in scenario
Q1. Let
∣∣ψdi 〉 denote the state immediately before the i-th decryption query in
scenario Q1 as before and, similarly, let
|ψ˜di 〉 = Ui−1V˜ . . .U1V˜U0 |s〉 (34)
denote the state immediately before the i-th decryption query in scenario Q0.
Let us first compare the action of V and V˜ on the state
∣∣ψdi 〉 for some i:
V|ψdi 〉 =
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV|j,m, c, τ〉 +
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV|j,m, c, τ〉
=
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉
+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕DK1(c), c, τ〉 , (35)
and
V˜
∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV˜|j,m, c, τ〉+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV˜|j,m, c, τ〉
=
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉
+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉 . (36)
Putting these together and using Eq. (30) twice, we get the following for the
fidelity of these two states:∣∣∣〈ψdi ∣∣ V˜†V ∣∣ψdi 〉∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2 +
∑
j,m,m′,c
λ∗j,m′,c,f(c)λj,m,c,f(c) 〈m′ ⊕⊥|m⊕DK1 (c)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2 +
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)
λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1(c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)
λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 1−Wval,i −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)
λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 1−Wval,i −
√∑
j,m,c
∣∣∣λj,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)∣∣∣2√∑
j,m,c
∣∣λj,m,c,f(c)∣∣2
= 1−Wval,i −
√
Wval,i
√
Wval,i
= 1− 2Wval,i . (37)
This implies that the trace distance [10] of these two states is bounded as
D
(
V
∣∣ψdi 〉 , V˜ ∣∣ψdi 〉) ≤√1− (1− 2Wval,i)2 ≤ 2√Wval,i . (38)
Before the first decryption query, the states of the adversary in both scenarios
Q0 and Q1 are identical, ∣∣ψd1〉 = U0 |s〉 . (39)
Before the second decryption query, the states are
|ψ˜d2〉 = U1V˜|ψd1〉 and |ψd2〉 = U1V|ψd1〉 , (40)
respectively. Therefore, for the trace distance we have
D
(
|ψd2〉, |ψ˜d2〉
)
= D
(
V|ψd1 〉, V˜|ψd1〉
)
≤ 2√Wval,1 . (41)
For arbitrary i > 0, the triangle inequality gives us
D
(
|ψdi+1〉, |ψ˜di+1〉
)
= D
(
UiV|ψdi 〉,UiV˜|ψ˜di 〉
)
= D
(
V|ψdi 〉, V˜|ψ˜di 〉
)
≤ D
(
V|ψdi 〉, V˜|ψdi 〉
)
+ D
(
V˜|ψdi 〉, V˜|ψ˜di 〉
)
= D
(
V|ψdi 〉, V˜|ψdi 〉
)
+ D
(
|ψdi 〉, |ψ˜di 〉
)
≤ 2√Wval,i + D(|ψdi 〉, |ψ˜di 〉) . (42)
By induction, it follows that
D
(∣∣ψdqd〉 , ∣∣∣ψ˜dqd〉) ≤ 2 qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i . (43)
This implies that, for any measurement, the probabilities for b′ = 1 in both
scenarios can not differ by more than the right-hand side of Eq. (43). Now the
expectation of that quantity is
E
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i
)
= 2
qd−1∑
i=1
E
(√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2−nτ/24
qd−1∑
i=1
i
≤ 2q2d 2−nτ/2 . (44)
Using the Markov inequality this implies, for any ξ > 0,
Pr
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i ≥ ξ
)
≤ 1
ξ
E
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2
ξ
q2d 2
−nτ/2 . (45)
That is, with probability at least 1− 2ξ q2d 2−nτ/2, we have that
PrQ1−b(b′ = 1) ≤ ProbQ0−b(b′ = 1) + ξ , (46)
irrespectively of the value of the bit b. It follows that
PrQ1−b(b′ = 1) ≤ PrQ0−b(b′ = 1) + ξ + 2
ξ
n2d 2
−nτ/2 . (47)
We can now choose ξ so that this has the most convenient form. One possibility
is ξ = 2−nτ/4, which leads to
PrQ1−b(b′ = 1) ≤ PrQ0−b(b′ = 1) + (1 + 2n2d) 2−nτ/4 , (48)
which establishes the claim (19). This completes the proof of the theorem. ⊓⊔
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